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ABSTRACT 
Although the mainstream "new political historians" have largely ignored the 
South, historians of the antebellum South have produced some of the most interesting 
recent works in political history. These scholars fall into two groups: one finds 
a white consensus, emphasizes ideology, and concentrates on evidence from "literary" 
sources; the other discovers evidence of conflict, stresses the material basis of 
political alignments, and combines quantitative with traditional evidence. In a brief 
review of books by Channing and Johnson, I point out that by concentrating on the immediate 
pre-war years, the authors cannot answer even the questions they themselves pose. Cooper's 
1978 ideological interpretation finesses the question of the connection between opinions on 
slavery and Unionism and fails to explain why the southerners' responses to the crises of 
1850 and 1860 were so different. 
The central work of the last two decades, Thornton's, presents the bold and complex 
thesis that the South was born libertarian and avoids many of the problems of the other works 
reviewed. His treatment of politics-as largely symoolic-expressive, rather than rational-
instrumental, and his lack of statistical sophistication, however, invite criticism. 
The most valuable facet of these works for American political history generally is 
that they restore politicians, policy, and political thought -- topics often shunted aside by 
the social history approach of the past generation -- to the study of politics. 
IDEALISM AND MATERIALISM IN ANTEBELLUM 
SOUTHERN POLITICAL HISTORY: A REVIEW ESSAY* 
Over the past generation, the chief developments in American 
political history have been first, a broadening of the sources 
regularly subject to intensive analysis to include not only 
manuscripts, printed official documents, and newspapers, but also 
election returns, legislative roll calls, and quantifiable 
socioeconomic data; second, the adoption from other social sciences of 
the statistical techniques with which to analyze such information; and 
third, the formulation of two more or less consistent, fairly 
complete, and certainly vigorously argued notions -- the ethnocultural 
thesis and the so-called "theory" of critical elections. With a few 
significant exceptions -- notably Professors McCormick and Holt -- the 
historians who have fostered these profound and valuable changes in 
historical practice have ignored the South. Nonetheless, southern 
historians, particularly those who concentrate on the antebellum 
period, have produced some of the most exciting work on party politics 
written in the last two decades -- a fact too seldom recognized by 
scholars accustomed to chillier climes. Before the reconstruction of 
American political history can proceed much farther, however, the 
sectional split must be overcome, the nation, reunited. What have we 
learned about prewar southern politics recently? 
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There is a long tradition of applying "social scientific" 
methods and hypotheses to the study of antebellum politics below 
Mason's and Dixon's line. Strongly influenced by Frederick Jackson 
Turner's stress on the social underpinnings of politics and his 
practice of attempting to tease correlations from multicolored maps, 
and more generally by the progressive propensity for finding class 
conflict in politics, Ulrich B. Phillips and Arthur C. Cole early in 
the century launched the socioeconomic school of southern politics. 
Carefully tracing Whig and Democratic alignments from pre-Jacksonian 
personal factionalism through what he believed were the reversals of 
party positions in Georgia on states rights between the 1830s and the 
1850s, Phillips saw a relatively consistent social thread -- planter 
Whigs fought small-farmer Democrats -- but found few systematic policy 
differences between the parties. Cole and later Charles Sellers added 
little more to Phillips's interpretation than greater geographical 
scope and urban allies for the Whig planters. 1 
While the progressives' cartographic correlations represented 
the best methodological practice then current, neither Phillips nor 
Cole analyzed ideologies in depth and neither connected party politics 
directly with the Civil War or convincingly delineated the links 
between policy positions -- especially those on slavery and unionism 
-- and socioeconomic divisions within the electorate. Such 
deficiencies notwithstanding, they set a high standard for later works 
in the field, and their basic findings were not seriously challenged 
until the 1970s. 
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Recent students of antebellum southern politics fall rather 
neatly into two camps. Under the first flag are those who find pre-
war political life characterized by a Caucasian consensus, emphasize 
ideology, and concentrate on impressionistic evidence. Under the 
second banner is a so far smaller host who, following Phillips and 
Cole, focus on conflict, stress the material or socioeconomic basis of 
partisan or other electoral contests, and blend into their books and 
articles heavy portions of quantified data. Although the two troops 
have long been called to muster, they have so far avoided direct 
conflict. Since I always like to watch a good fight, especially from 
the sidelines, one of my purposes today is to advertise the match and 
thereby to encourage each side to do battle openly. 
There are, it seems to me, eight major empirical questions 
which any descriptive treatment of antebellum southern politics must 
address and which any general interpretation must account for: 
1. How much continuity in electoral alignments was there 
between and within three periods -- 1820-36, 1836-52, and 1852-60? 
2. What was the basis in ideas and material circumstances for 
the continuity and change that existed? 
3. What were the policy correlates of those electoral 
alignments? 
4. Was the South's political thought solid after 1830 or was 
the southern mind seriously divided? 
5. To what degree were Southern governments in the period 
from 1820-60 of, by, and/or for the planters? 
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6. To what extent did nonslaveholding whites favor or oppose 
secession? 
7. How much continuity was there between previous party 
politics and the struggle over secession? This question suggests two 
subsidiary ones: A. Was secession manipulated by a small elite, 
playing on temporary fears? Or, B. Was it a logical outgrowth of 
previous politics? 
8. Did political parties hasten or hold back the crisis which 
led to Civil War? 
Only one historian, so far as I know, has yet hazarded answers 
to all these questions, and even he (Mills Thornton) has so far 
confined his work to one state. 2 Others, fascinated, as many 
historians have always been, with the trauma of civil war, have 
focused on the events immediately preceding secession. Although the 
desire to slice off a short, manageable period and study it in detail 
is understandable, such a concentration in this case seems to me 
inevitably to beg even the limited questions about the breakup of the 
Union which scholars seek to answer. Let me illustrate the point. 
In his 1970 book, Crisis of Fear, Steven A. Channing asserted 
that paranoia was a necessary and perhaps sufficient condition for 
secession in South Carolina. 3 Presumably, this heightened tension was 
requisite because South Carolina whites would not otherwise have been 
unified in their willingness to leave the Union and to risk civil war 
in order to protect slavery. The consensus was, in other words, 
recent and temporary, and Palmetto State politicos, whom Channing 
describes as having a "benevolent authoritarian attitude toward the 
ma:::s of citizens," were apprehensive that non-slaveholders and 
northern-connected businessmen might defect if not stirred up.4 
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Yet by concentrating only on the events of 1859 to 1861 and by 
not specifying a clear counterfactual, Channing renders his case 
unprovable. Unity is always'relative: how united were white 
Carolinians in 1860, compared to earlier times? Do events before or 
after 1860 cast light on the question of whether the politicians were 
right to fear poor white or capitalist defection? How important to 
the creation of unity was it that South Carolina had the least 
vigorous structured political competition of any state throughout the 
antebellum period -- that Calhoun's duchy did not emerge from his 
antiparty shadow even in the l850s? Do earlier, later, or 
contemporary instances, in South Carolina or elsewhere, of paranoia 
without secession or secession without exaggerated fears shed any 
light on the adequacy or correctness of Channing's explanation? 
Or consider Michael P. Johnson's thesis that secession in 
Georgia was in part a struggle over which whites would rule the state, 
a preemptive revolution by upper-class slaveholders who feared that if 
he were president of an unbroken union, Lincoln would succeed in 
employing federal patronage to build up an antislavery party in the 
South. Potentially disloyal nonslaveholders instinctively opposed 
secession, even though most had previously been loyal Democrats 
because of what Johnson describes as their "ignorance and inertia." 
By contrast, Bell and Douglas voters in black belt counties often 
defected to the secessionists, not out of paranoia, for these 
privileged individuals were less subject to unreasoning passions than 
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the lower-classes were, but because they recognized that the 
reactionary revolution was in their interest. 5 The secession 
election, in other words, strikingly reduced false consciousness and 
stripped away habitual behavior: The real became rational, and vice 
versa. 
But Johnson's materialist hypothesis, no less than Channing's 
social psychological one, cannot be corroborated by looking only at 
the events of 1859 to 1861. How firm had nons1aveholder loyalty to 
slavery been in Georgia earlier, or, looking past the Civil War, how 
successful were Reconstruction Republicans in building up a white 
following by the judicious use of patronage?6 Does the longer-term 
counterfactua1 indicate that the slaveholder secessionists' alleged 
fears were well-grounded, or that they were unreasonable? Why had 
mountain and pine barren poorer whites traditionally voted for the 
Democrats? Did the confusion of parties in the state from 1850 on 
contribute to the fluidity of allegiances during the secession crisis? 
In general, was the well-known partial reshuffling of alignments 
between the 1860 presidential and the 1861 secession elections in the 
state the result of a profound, if recent "internal crisis" or of a 
more longstanding conflict? In either case, how serious was the 
social contradiction, and why didn't stronger evidence of it appear at 
other times? 
As the adjective "antebellum" implies, even historians who 
have not homed in on the years around 1860 have tended to view the 
first six decades of the nineteenth century as a well-made play with 
secession as the predetermined climax. The most outstanding example 
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of this "Waiting for Yancey" plot line is William J. Cooper, Jr.'s The 
South and the Politics of Slavery, 1828-1856, the first thorough 
research monograph to carry the political history of the whole South 
from the 1830s through the mid-1850s. 7 Relying entirely on newspapers 
and manuscripts, Cooper argues that the slavery issue dominated every 
presidential campaign in the South from 1828 to 1860, and that 
economic issues were important only in state elections, and then only 
during what he terms the years of the "great aberration" from the 
panic of 1837 to Tyler's Texas annexation scheme in 1843-44. Either 
because the independent, antiparty, rabidly proslavery Calhounites 
forced Whigs and Democrats to take extreme positions to gain their 
votes or because the southern political public was so proslavery and 
h ·· b· 8 put so muc we1ght on the 1ssue -- Cooper offers oth explanat10ns 
major party elites were virtually forced to charge each other in every 
campaign with being soft on abolition or insufficiently protective of 
slaveholder interests. Since the parties were driven to appear "more 
southern than thou," party competition fed the continuing and ever 
deepening crisis. 
Cooper's is a politics of ideological consensus and nearly 
unbroken rhetorical continuity in which class divisions are implicitly 
dismissed; party splits are seen as superficial, and issues, as 
largely symbolic; and electoral politics is generally divorced from 
state and national policy, except on slavery-related issues. Since he 
stops in 1856, and since he abjures or disdains the systematic 
analysis of electoral returns, Cooper avoids confronting alternative 
descriptions and explanations, but even in his own terms, he finesses 
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two crucial questions: First, what was the connection in southern 
political minds between unionism and slavery? Admitting that white 
southerners backed slavery, were there significant divisions across 
time or socioeconomic groups on the question of whether they were 
willing to give up the union to guarantee the right of bondage? If 
such divisions did exist, as most fireaters certainly appear to have 
9 believed, then the consensus may have been more apparent than real. 
Second, if competition for the e~treme position on slavery was always 
the dominant strategy, why did the Whigs adopt a unionist stance from 
1850 to 1852, why did the Democratic response of painting their 
opponents as insufficiently pros lavery fail in this case, and why did 
most Democratic politicians so quickly and successfully move from an 
extreme states' rights stance toward the moderate position of support 
for the 1850 Compromise?10 
Cooper argues that white manhood suffrage, high turnout, the 
fact that politicians continually oiled their machines and campaigned 
extensively among the masses, and travelers' impressions that white 
southerners of all classes continually di~cussed politics prove that 
the prewar southern polity was small-d democratic. Conversely, in The 
Secessionist Impulse: Alabama and Mississippi in 1860, a book which 
suffers from many of the same difficulties of other works which focus 
on the years immediately before the War, William L. Barney views 
southern democracy as mostly rhetoric, pointing to regressive taxation 
in Nississippi and other policies in both states which favored rich 
ld h "1 d " 11 slaveho ers at t e expense of less pr~v~ ege c~t~zens. But no 
other work has so boldly and pervasively confronted the problem of 
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democracy in the antebellum South as Mills Thornton's Politics and 
Power in a Slave Society: Alabama. 1800-1860. Since Thornton's is, 
to my mind at least, the most profound, subtle, and challenging work 
ever written on prewar southern politics, and since one of my chief 
purposes today is to stimulate critical research to test, refine, and 
perhaps refute some of his contentions and findings, it is necessary 
to pursue Thornton's reasoning in some detail. 
The white South, Thornton claims (from Toqueville, out of 
Bailyn) was born doubly free -- that is, not enslaved, and 
libertarian. The white southerner of all classes, but especially the 
self-sufficient, parochial, non-market-oriented hill country yeoman, 
was deathly afraid of dependence on fellow white men or of other 
relationships which, by challenging his independence, reminded him of 
slavery, and deeply wary of concentrations of either private or 
governmental power. Since wise governors were those who symbolically 
slayed private privilege, Andrew Jackson's war against the monster 
bank both exemplified and reinforced this notion of proper 
governmental action for the post-revolutionary generations. The 
Jacksonian political style, prefigured in Alabama by the assaults on 
the "aristocratic" Broad River cousinry in the 1820s, thus linked 
voters who responded to emotional and symbolic, not rational and 
instrumental appeals with political entrepreneurs who often cynically 
manipulated what Thornton refers to as the "myths and prejudices" of 
h h " 12 te w 1te masses. 
Note the radical differences between fellow consensualists 
Cooper and Thornton: For Cooper, the ideological consensus was on the 
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protection of black slavery, which had, for current and prospective 
slaveholders at least, a possible underlying material basis, but which 
cannot account for divisions over such economic issues as banks, 
tariffs, or internal improvements. In Thornton's more purely 
ideological theory, on the other hand, the basic issue was not 
protection of black slavery, but avoidance of white "slavery," or, to 
put it another way, preservation of white independence and formal 
equality. Since this was a thread which clever politicos could and 
did find running through all sorts of governmental policies, 
Thornton's thesis applies to economic as well as slave-related issues. 
Therefore, while Cooper's "great aberration" suggestion and his whole 
analysis would be cast into serious doubt by quantitative evidence of 
substantial voter continuity in state and national contests running 
through and beyond the 1837-43 period,13 since such continuity would 
tend to show that voters perceived no aberration, Thornton's more 
flexible thesis could easily accomodate such a finding. 14 
After brilliant chapters on the composition, structure, and 
mores of both the legislature and the political parties and a closely 
reasoned analysis of the members' general incompetence and the often 
self-defeating policies they adopted, Thornton turns to the question 
of why Alabama responded differently to the sectional crises of 1850 
and 1860. Although he differs from most recent historians when he 
asserts that the Compromise of 1850 represented southern "appeasement" 
(p. 187), Thornton believes that in 1850 white Alabamians were not yet 
psychologically receptive to a crusade, that they were then 
unconvinced of the reality of the northern threat, that most still 
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accepted the major parties' dogma that partisan political action was 
the best protection for southern rights, and that the Whig-Unionist 
line that the compromise would end sectional agitation proved 
attractive to white southerners who deeply desired to be let alone. 
Alabamians' views changed partly because of the familiar national 
events of the 1850s -- Kansas-Nebraska, John Brown, and all that15 
but much more because of the desparate thrashings of Alabama Whiggery 
in its prolonged death throes, the combination of the boring-from-
within tactics of what he calls the "right fireater" Yanceyites and 
the independence of the antiparty "left fireaters," and (a notion I 
find logically but not convincingly developed) what Thornton alleges 
was a socioeconomic and political crisis which racked the state and 
particularly its poorer sections in the 1850s. 
Thornton's crisis is virtually the mirror image of Johnson's. 
According to Thornton, the rapid expansion of railroads, the increased 
penetration of market activity into areas previously devoted to 
subsistence farming, and the explosion of governmental funding to 
assist corporations, schools, libraries, and eleemosynary institutions 
threatened to upset the parochial lives of Alabama small farmers and 
the negative control they had always enjoyed over Alabama politics. 
Secession was thus for them a preemptive, symbolic revolt against the 
modern world -- a world represented by market-oriented planters and 
home-grown capitalists as well as by abolitionists add free soilers. 
Johnson's and Thornton's crises pit the same groups against each 
other, but with the couper and coupee reversed: the one is a 
conservative revolution against the small farmers, the other, a 
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liberal last stand by parochial supporters of least government against 
upper-class governmental expansionists at home and the spectre of both 
Whiggery and abolition abroad. Directly contrary to Johnson and much 
more convincingly, Thornton shows that Alabama's secession 
constitution of 1861 was strongly anti-corporation and laissez-faire. 
It was therefore the fulfillment of the small-farmer agrarian 
libertarianism which Thornton contends was a recurrent and often 
dominant theme of Alabama politics from the attacks on the 
Crawfordites in the 1820s to the Populist crusade of the 1890s. 
What seems to me most valuable about all these works, and 
Thornton's in particular, for American political history in general is 
that they restore politicians, policy, and political thought to the 
study of politics, from which they have so often been shunted aside in 
the social history approach to politics which has become dominant in 
the last twenty years. Votes are more than imperfect public opinion 
polls and politics is more than an unbiased mechanism for translating 
into policy inherently non-political philosophies attributed to social 
groups in the electorate. 
Yet I cannot end without noting two objectionable facets of 
the books which I have discussed: First, the authors nearly always 
employ simplistic statistical techniques or misuse sophisticated 
ones.
16 It is certainly not a striking testimonial to the idea of 
progress that Barney and Thornton continue to rely heavily on the same 
technique of cartographic correlation which graced Phillips's 1901 
Ph.D. dissertation. Second, I disagree fundamentally with the view 
of politics, which all but Johnson share with such ethnoculturalists 
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as Formisano, as primarily a symbolic, irrational battle largely 
divorced for the voters, if not the politicians, from material self-
interest. Just as I would not turn political history into a mere 
branch of social history, neither would I totally segregate the two. 17 
At the very least, those who consider political choice as usually 
based on rational self-interested calculation should not abandon the 
battle quickly, even against such a formidable opponent as Mills 
Thornton. In Alabama in the 1850s, for instance, it was perfectly 
consistent with either a self-interest or a libertarian-irrational 
model for North Alabama poor farmers to oppose government subsidies to 
railroads which would primarily enrich townspeople, planters, budding 
exploiters of the state's mineral wealth, and, of course, the railroad 
builders. But while the Thornton thesis would predict that the same 
farmers would vigorously oppose what was for the hill country the much 
more pervasive intrusion of public schools into their lives, the 
rational calculus would predict that small farmers would favor, or, 
since the tax system forced others to bear a large share of the costs, 
at least be indifferent to schools. I therefore count the fact that, 
as Thornton shows, public funding for schools grew by 360% in the 
1850s in the state (p. 294) as a triumph of Yeoman rationality, and, I 
hope, a token of more such victories over irrationalism in political 
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